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This paper is intended to de scribe and illustrate, in a brief 
but not trivial manner, how the methods of modern mathematical 
science can be used to sharpen an executive's most effective decision-
making tool: his own imagination. 
The mathematic s involved and its application to marketing 
situations is described and demonstrated in more detail in MATHEMATICA 
publications j "A Study in Promotional Competition" and "Mathematical 
Studie s in Marketing Competition". 
MATHEMATICS AND THE MANAGERIAL IMAGINATION 
Introduction 
Mathematics is a new force in business. Its vitality lies in its direct 
contributions to the managerial imagination. Its triumphs are indirect, like 
the triumphs of a teacher with successful students. Mathematics does not 
contribute uniformly across business probl ems. It is not very dependable. 
On any specific problem it may prove a god-send, or it may be no help at all. 
Judicious combinations of common sense, adrenalin, and arithmetic are 
still the most useful, and most used, managerial tools available. Mathematics 
complements these dependable techniques with new insights and new perspectives 
for thinking about business problems. 
There is a curious natural law in business that places a premium on 
managerial imagination - The Bigger the Problem, the Fewer the Facts. 
This law manifests itself in the necessary paradox of "the scientific foreman 
and the intuitive president". Many problems at the foreman's level can be 
quantified, analyzed, and optimized down to the last few percent - problems in 
production scheduling, make or buy, even allocating salesmen's time to 
customers. But most problems at the president's level involve such uncertainties 
and intangibles that any decision at all takes courage. For instance, the problems 
of whether to build a plant, and how to build the same plant, are of completely 
different orders of magnitude. 
Thus, this simple law places increasing emphasis on the art of sensing 
essentials early, of drawing inferences from barely sufficient information. 
For example, a major decision, supported by a solid factual basis, in all likeli-
hood, should have been made several years ago! Such an art places an increasing 
burden on the managerial imagination - not in imagining non-existent facts, but 
in erecting, demolishing, and re-erecting conceptual structures to organize and 
use the few facts available as intelligently as possible. 
And it is to this need, in the managerial imagination, that mathematic s 
offers its most decisive potentials - a wealth of imagination procedures for 
thinking through and about problems and situations in business. 
The be st mathematic sis done on the backs of old envelope s; but it take s 
no less than the best to collapse a year (or a century) of thought to envelope 
size. For the aim of mathematics is to make life simpler and more under-
standable, through organizing imagination procedures as simply and as 
understandably as possible. 
Like the 80 year old Frenchman, who found he had known how to speak 
prose all his life, modern mathematics has discovered it is quite a general 
discipline for handling ideas. Numbers, its traditional preoccupation, are 
particularly easy ideas to handle, but any other well-defined ideas are equally 
interesting. 
Above all, mathematics is an art form. Modern mathematics seeks 
beauty where older mathematics sought truth; and beauty has proven a more 
powerful goal. Yet, paradoxically, great mathematics inevitably finds its 
roots in practical affair s of men. 
The Mathematic s of Game sand 1Deci sions 
In the past few years, a whole new branch of mathematics has emerged, 
in the service of those who know it and can use it - the mathematics of Games 
and Decisions. This kind of mathematics studies problems of making decisions 
under various conditions of complexity, uncertainty, and competition. 
Many situations of decision are so rich in choice, that the sheer complexity 
of sorting and relating choice and consequence dwarfs the intuition. Thus we see 
mathematics employed to aid in decision problems of great complexity -
Linear Programming is a good example of such mathematics in action. More 
generally, Mathematical Programming, encompassing linear and non-linear 
models of static and dynamic models seeks to handle complexity in decision 
making. 
The decision problem is formulated as a Mathematical Program by 
constructing a numerical measure of achievement (profit, costs, etc.) as 
a function of decisions. This measure is called an objective function. As a 
rule, relationships will exist among various components of a decision (the 
amount of goods shipped out of a warehouse cannot exceed the amount in 
storage there, etc.) which can be expressed in mathematical form. These 
relationships are called constraints. Thus Mathematical Programming is 
concerned with maximizing (or minimizing) a given objective function subject 
to a given set of constraints. 
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At another level of difficulty, decision problems may deal with uncertainties 
of a statistical nature. Outcome may depend on chance events as well as on 
decisions. Such problems are dealt with by extending technique s of Mathematical 
Programming, not only to outcomes of decisions in determinate situations, but 
to statistics of outcomes in probabilistic situations. For example, we may be 
interested in maximizing the expected value (long-run average) of an outcome, 
or in maximizing the probability that a certain outcome is reached, etc. 
Finally, we turn to decision problems of competition, which contain 
complexities and uncertainties of a most subtle nature - the uncertainties of 
other decision makers acting under self interest, and the complexities of the 
structure of mutual aspirations, antagonism, and fears of the competitors. 
These problems, as they occur in a business environment, are to be the center 
of our attention. We use the term "game" to describe our interest in the com-
petitive aspects of a situation (as opposed, say, to its technological or sociolo-
gical aspects, etc.). 
A game is an abstract model of a situation of competition among several 
players; this model relates strategies used by the players with their jointly 
determined payoffs. A game may describe a parlour game, such as chess, 
bridge, or poker, business competition, military or political warfare, or any 
other situation where several interrelated payoffs attend voluntary choices of 
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strategy. Players may be persons, teams of persons, business firms, nations, 
or other groups capable of exercising voluntary choice s. Payoffs may be in 
dollars (immediate or in some long-run form), probabilities of "winning" a 
game, probabilities of being alive after the competition, or any other motivations 
conceivable. Strategies may be any appropriate well-defined plans of action, 
possible with contingency arrangements with respect to future events occurring 
during the course of the competition. 
Game Theory seeks to understand the anatomy of competition described in 
games. It considers, simultaneously, alternatives and motivations of all com-
petitors, and attempts to find landmarks in the resulting competitive structure. 
It identifies and organizes central concepts and relationships in this anatomy, 
and provides a convenient framework in which to ask and answer questions. 
While Game Theory can be put to many uses - to study parlour games, 
general economic systems, military situations, political problems, etc. - we 
shall be interested in applying its concepts and techniques to marketing competition. 
Thus, we seek an understanding of competition among marketing units - manu-
facturers, wholesalers, retailers - whose major activities involve such strategies 
as promoting, pricing, distributing, applying selling pressures, etc. Aspects 
of manufacturing, finance, engineering, etc. in these companies are taken for 
granted, in context, and related to their marketing roles. 
There are many instances of "mixed emotions!! in a structure of these marketing 
units. Everyone in a vertical manufacturer - wholesaler-retailer chain of a given 
product has a common interest in building movement in that product - yet each 
member of the chain competes for larger markups. And a single corporate 
entity may play two or more roles - retailing and wholesaling, say - in a given 
industry structure. Thus, the situations and motivations of companies have both 
cooperating and competitive aspects, depending on the specific structures. 
Our general approach to marketing competition is to consider an industry 
structure of several marketing units, along with a final consumer group, and to 
formulate the profits of these units as interrelated functions of their marketing 
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strategie s. The se inte rrelated functions define a gaITIe which we study and then 
reinterpret into the language of the original ITIarketing situation. 
GaITIe Theory is a philosopher's stone - not an oracle. It does not predict 
what an opponent will do in any given situation, but it does enable a strategist 
to forITIulate crucial issues in questions of strategy" and to understand with 
broader perspective and keener insights the nature and character of the COITI-
petition. As with puddings, however, the proof is in the theory itself, to which 
we turn without further ado. 
An ExaITIple in Promotional COITIpetition 
Consider a heavy industrial goods industry with various producers and con-
SUITIe rs scattered over the country. Varying producing costs and freight rates 
re suIt in varying cOITIpetitive situations in different regional ITIarkets. Below is 
a "ITIap" of an industry, with three producers (nuITIbered 1,2,3) and four regional 
ITIarkets (lettered A, B, C, D). Each ITIarket has a total deITIand of 100 physical 
units; the selling price is 15 per unit, delivered. The unit variable producing 
costs of the producers, and the freight rates between points are indicated on the 
ITIap. 
~ (5) 0(8) 
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This inforITIation can be sUITIITIarized in the following table, showing the unit 
ITIargins - price less producing variable costs less freight costs - for each 





A B C D 
1 7 4 5 2 
Producer 2 6 5 6 3 
3 3 2 5 8 
The competition among producers is taken to be purely promotional: each 
producer obtains a share of each market equal to its share of sales promotion 
in that market. For example, if companies 1, 2, 3 spend 200, 200, 100, re~pect­
ively in Market A, their physical volumes will be 40, 40, 20. Since, in Market A, 
the unit margins are 7 ~ 6, 3, gross profits of (40) (7) - 200, (40) (6) -200, 
(20) (3) - 100, or 80, 40, -40 result. More generally, if 1, 2, 3 spend x, y, z 
on sales promotion, the following information results. 
Competition in Market A 
Unit Sales Physical Gross 
Company Margin Effort Volume Profit 
1 7 100x 700x x - x 
x+y+z x+y+z 




3 3 100z 300z z - z 
x+y+z x+y+z 
In the numerical situation above, if company 2 reduces its selling outlay to 
100, the new physical volumes become 50, 25, 25, and 2J s gross profit becomes 
(25) (6) - 100 = 50, an increase over its previous figure. As all three companies 
jockey for profit maximizing positions in the market» they approach a competitive 
equilibrium: a balance of strategies such that each company is simultaneously 
maximizing its own profits against all other company's strategies. This balance 
of strategies can be deduced mathematically in Market A, and leads to the 
following information. 
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Competitive Equilibrium in Market A . 
Unit Sales Physical Gross 
Company Margin Effort Volume Profit 
1 7 174 54 204 
2 6 149 46 127 
3 3 0 0 0 
Notice incidentally all three companies are considerably better off (204 versus 80, 
127 versus 40, and 0 versus -40) than at the arbitrary point illustrated numerically 
above. 
Competitive equilibria can be deduced similarly in each of the other markets, 
with the following results. 
Physical Volumes at Competitive Equilibrium 
A B C D Total 
1 54 44 29 0 127 
2 46 56 42 27 171 
3 0 0 29 73 102 
Total 100 100 100 100 400 
Gross Profits at Competitive Equilibrium 
A B C D Total 
1 204 77 41 0 322 
2 127 157 107 21 412 
3 0 0 41 425 466 
Total 331 234 189 446 1200 
These performances lead to consolidated operating statements as follows. 
Company 
1 2 3 
Sales 1905 2565 1530 
Prime Costs 635 1368 714 
Freight Costs 571 308 87 
Selling Costs 377 477 263 
Gro s s Profits 322 412 466 
- - - - - - -----------------------
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Notice that companies are forced out of markets in this competition when 
unit margins fall below certain levels. This critical differential varies with the 
number of producers active in the market. In illustration, if all other producers 
have the same unit margins, the given producer's critical value depends on the 
number of competitors as shown in the table: 
Critical % - marginal 




Number of Competitors 
2 3 4 5 




This results from a more general relationship which can he stated as the following: 
Theorem. If a producer's unit margin does not exceed 
(n-l)!n times the harmonic mean of its competitor's unit 
margins, that producer cannot operate profitably at com-
petitive equilibrium. 
Another phenomenon of interest in this competition is the accelerated manner 
in which a unit margin advantage is parlayed into a correspondingly larger gross 
profit advantage. For example, in Market A Producer 1 has a 17% unit margin 
advantage over Producer 2 (7 versus 6 in the table of unit margins above -
Producer 3 is squeezed out of this market via the Theorem above). Yet the 
profit advantage is 61% (204 ver sus 127). The relevant fact here is that the ratio 
of unit margins (1.17) when cubed is equal to the ratio of ultimate gross profits 
(1. 61). This is an exact statement in a two-producer market, and approximately 
true when more than two producers are competing. 


